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OPINION OF THE COURT  
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Stella and Joseph Pacitti, on behalf of their daughter, Joanna Pacitti 
("plaintiffs"), appeal the District Court's  
 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Macy's East, Inc. ("Macy's") on 
their state-law contract and tort 
claims arising from Macy's role as promoter and host of "Macy's Search for 
Broadway's New `Annie' " (the 
"Search"). Plaintiffs also appeal the District Court's order limiting the 
scope of  
 
discovery. For the reasons that follow, we reverse on both grounds and 




In May 1996, the producers of "Annie," the Classic Annie Production 
Limited Partnership (the "producers"), 
and Macy's, a retail department store chain, entered into an agreement 
under which Macy's agreed to 
sponsor the "Annie 20th Anniversary Talent Search." See App. at 129a- 32a. 
Specifically, Macy's agreed 
to promote the event and to host the auditions at its stores in the 
following locations: New York City, 
Boston, Atlanta, Miami, and King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. See id. at 
129a-30a. The producers agreed to 
select one finalist from each regional store to compete in a final 
audition at Macy's Herald Square store in 
New York City. See id. at 130a. The producers also agreed to offer the 
winner of the final audition "a 
contract for that role to appear in the 20th Anniversary Production of 
Annie .. ., subject to good faith 
negotiations and in accordance with standard Actors' Equity Production 
Contract guidelines" (the "standard 
actors' equity contract"). 2 Id.  
 
Macy's publicized the Search in newspapers and in its stores in the five 
regional locations. All of the 
promotional materials referred to the event as "Macy's Search for 
Broadway's New `Annie.' " See id. at 
59a-83a. Plaintiffs learned of the Search from an advertisement in the 
Philadelphia Inquirer that stated, in 
pertinent part:  
 
If you are a girl between 7 and 12 years old and 4 *6<!DAG> or under, the 
starring role in this 20th 
Anniversary Broadway production and national tour could be yours! Just get 
your hands on an application . 
. . and bring it to the audition at Macy's King of Prussia store. . . . 
Annie's director/lyricist . . . will pick the 
lucky actress for final callbacks . . . at Macy's Herald Square. Annie 
goes on the road this fall and opens on 
Broadway Spring 1997. 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
2. The Actors' Equity Association requires producers to attach its 
standard "Agreement and Rules 
Governing Employment under the Production Contract" to "all contracts 
where production is bonded as a 
Bus and Truck Tour." See App. at 141a. As we discuss below, that contract 
provides, among other things, 
that the producer retains the authority to replace the actor at any time 
so long as the actor is compensated 
through the term of the contract. See id. at 168a. Id. at 208a.  
 
In June 1996, Joanna, then 11-years old, and her mother picked up an 
application at the King of Prussia 
store. The application form announced:  
 
Annie, America's most beloved musical[,] and Macy's, the world's largest 
store, are conducting a talent 
search for a new "Annie" to star in the 20th Anniversary Broadway 
production and national Tour of Annie. . 
. .  
 
Id. at 22a. The reverse side of the application form contained the 
"Official Rules [of] Macy's Search for 
Broadway's New `Annie.' " See id. at 23a. In addition to explaining the 
two-part audition process, the 
official rules provided, in relevant part:  
 
1. All participants must be accompanied by a paren t or legal guardian and 
must bring completed application 
forms to one of the Macy's audition locations . . . and be prepared to 
audition. . . .  
 
2. The "Annie" selected at the "Annie-Off -Final Callback" will be 
required to work with a trained dog. The 
tour commences in Fall 1996, with a Broadway opening tentatively scheduled 
for Spring 1997, [and] with a 




6. [Y]ou and your parent or legal guardian a re responsible for your own 
conduct, and hereby release 
Macy's . . . and the Producers . . . from any liability to or with regard 
to the participants and/or her parent or 




8. All determinations made by the Producers or the ir designated judges 
are being made at their sole 
discretion and each such determination is final.  
 
Id.3 Unlike Macy's contract with the producers, neither the  
 
(Text continued on page 6) 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
3. Because the District Court relied heavily on the official rules in 
rendering its decision, we provide them 
here in full: 1. All participants must be accompanied by a paren t or 
legal guardian and must bring completed 
application forms to one of the Macy's audition locations on the dates and 
times listed on the reverse of this 
form and be prepared to audition. Only one parent or legal guardian may 
accompany each participant.  
 
2. The "Annie" selected at the "Annie-Off -Final Callback" will be 
required to work with a trained dog. The 
tour commences Fall 1996, with a Broadway opening tentatively scheduled 
for Spring 1997, [and] with a 
post-Broadway tour to follow. Parent(s) or guardian(s) will accompany tour 
children. Additional information 
on arrangements for the final call-back and show rehearsals and 
performances will be provided to each 
regional finalist selected to attend the "Annie-Off-Final Callback" 
audition in New York City.  
 
3. By participating, you agree to follow these Official Rules and you 
consent to the taking of a photograph, 
for identification purposes only. You also agree that Macy's (and/or a 
Macy's designee) may use your name, 
likeness, biographical data and /or [sic] voice for advertising, 
promotional activities and/or publicity, whether 
or not related to the audition and also acknowledge that such use requires 
neither any further permission nor 
any compensation. Participants who are members of Actors' Equity 
Association must identify themselves to 
an event representative as such, and will not be audio or video taped 
during the audition process. All 
application forms are the sole property of Macy's and Macy's is not 
responsible for any lost, destroyed, 
incomplete, illegible or otherwise deficient or unusable application 
forms.  
 
4. In order to participate in the audition, you mu st complete and return 
the reverse application form, be a 
U.S. resident, between the ages of 7 and 12 as of June 2, 1996[,] and you 
must be available for the final 
audition on Thursday, August 8, 1996[,] in New York City.  
 
5. Macy's may require that you verify your date of birth and may require 
that you provide a certified copy of 
your birth or baptismal certificate, school records or other document that 
states your date of birth.  
 
6. Participants' parents or legal guardians are re sponsible for any tax 
obligations and expenses you may 
incur (such as the cost of travel or hotel accommodations) for the initial 
audition. The Classic Annie 
Production Limited Partnership (the "Producers") will provide travel and 
hotel accommodations to finalists 
selected for the "Annie- official rules4 nor any of the promotional 
materials included a provision informing the 
participants that the winner of the Search would receive only the 
opportunity to enter into a standard actors' 
equity contract with the producers.  
 
Joanna and her mother signed the official rules and proceeded to the 
initial audition at the King of Prussia 
store. Macy's publicized the event by placing balloons, signs, pins, and 
other promotional materials 
advertising "Macy's Search for Broadway's New `Annie' " throughout the 
store. After auditioning hundreds 
of "Annie" hopefuls, the producers selected Joanna as the regional 
finalist. In a press release, Macy's 
announced Joanna's success to the public: "One in Ten She'll Be a Star!!! 
Macy's Brings Local Girl One 
Step Closer Towards `Tomorrow' to Become Broadway's New `Annie.' " Id. at 
77a. The press release 
further provided:  
 
Philadelphia's own, twelve year-old Joanna Pacitti, will join nine other 
talented girls for a final audition to 
cast the title role in the 20th Anniversary production of the classic Tony 
Award-winning musical, Annie, 
coming to Broadway this season. . . . Ten finalists, most of whom were 




Off " call-back in Macy's Herald Square on Thursday, August 8, 1996. In 
addition, you and your parent or 
legal guardian are responsible for your own conduct, and hereby release 
Macy's East, Inc., its affiliates and 
each of their respective officers, directors, employees, agents, 
successors and assigns (for purposes of this 
Paragraph 6, all included within the term "Macy's") and the Producers and 
their successors and assigns from 
any liability to or with regard to the participants and/or her parent or 
legal guardian with respect to the 
audition(s).  
 
7. The audition is subject to all applicable laws and regulations.  
 
8. All determinations made by the Producers or the ir designated judges 
are being made at their sole 
discretion and each such determination is final.  
 
App. at 23a.  
 
4. Throughout the remainder of this opinion, we refer to the official 
rules and the application form as the 
"official rules." . . ., will vie for the chance to become Broadway's new 
"Annie."  
 
Id. (emphasis in original).  
 
At the producers' expense, Joanna and her mother traveled to New York City 
for Joanna to participate in 
the "Annie-Off-Final Call Back" at Macy's Herald Square store. After 
auditioning for two days, the 
producers selected Joanna to star as "Annie" in the 20th Anniversary 
Broadway production. Again, Macy's 
announced Joanna's success to the public, referring to her as "Broadway's 
New `Annie.' " See id. at 
59a-83a.  
 
Joanna and her mother met with the producers and signed an "Actors' Equity 
Association Standard 
Run-of-the- Play Production Contract." See id. at 133a-68a. Consistent 
with the Actors' Equity 
Association's rules governing production contracts, the producers retained 
the right to replace Joanna with 
another actor at any time as long as they paid her salary through the term 
of her contract. See id. at 168a.  
 
For nearly a four-month period, Joanna performed the role of "Annie" in 
the production's national tour. In so 
doing, Joanna appeared in over 100 performances and in six cities. In 
February 1997, approximately three 
weeks before the scheduled Broadway opening, the producers informed Joanna 
that her "services [would] 
no longer be needed," and she was replaced by her understudy. Id. at 12a.  
 
On March 21, 1997, plaintiffs filed suit against Macy's in Pennsylvania 
state court, alleging breach of 
contract and the following tort claims: (1) fraudulent misrepresentation, 
(2) equitable estoppel, (3) public 
policy tort, (4) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and (5) punitive damages. See id. 
at 15a-21a. In particular, plaintiffs alleged that Macy's failed to 
deliver the prize it had offered, i.e., the 
starring role of "Annie" on Broadway, and that Macy's knew it could not 
award this prize but promoted its 
ability to do so nonetheless. See id. Macy's subsequently removed the suit 
to federal district court based on 
diversity. During discovery, plaintiffs sought to uncover information on 
the relationship between Macy's and 
the producers and on the pecuniary benefit Macy's received from sponsoring 
the Search. Macy's objected 
to their request, and the District Court limited discovery to "what 
promises, if any, were made by defendant 
prior to and at the final audition . . . in New York City that the person 
selected at that audition would appear 
in the role as Annie." Id. at 38a. Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, 
and the District Court denied that 
motion on December 19, 1997. See id. at 50a.  
 
Macy's then moved for summary judgment, contending that it did not deprive 
Joanna of any prize she had 
been promised and that her rights were limited by the terms of her 
contract with the producers. See id. at 
24a, 126a. In support of its motion, Macy's proffered, among other things, 
its contract with the producers, 
which, as explained above, specified that the successful contestant would 
receive only the opportunity to 
enter into a standard actors' equity contract with the producers.  
 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Macy's. See 
Pacitti v. Macy's, No. Civ. A. 
97-2557, 1998 WL 512938 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1998). Addressing plaintiffs' 
breach of contract claim, the 
District Court concluded that the contract was unambiguous and capable of 
only one reasonable 
interpretation -- i.e., that Macy's offered only an audition for the 
opportunity to enter into a standard actors' 
equity contract with the producers for the title role in "Annie." See id. 
at *3-4. Therefore, the Court rejected 
plaintiffs' contention that Macy's offered Joanna a guaranteed Broadway 
opening, see id. at *4, and the 
Court concluded:  
 
Plaintiffs received the benefit of their bargain by being offered a 
contract with the Producers for the "Annie" 
role, in exchange for Ms. Pacitti participating in "Macy's Search for 
Broadway's New Annie." . . . When the 
Producers offered a contract to Plaintiffs consistent with the terms of 
the Official Rules[,] any possible 
obligation Macy's had to Plaintiffs was fully met.  
 
Id. After rejecting plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, the District 
Court turned to their tort claims. See id. 
Reasoning that each cause of action was predicated upon the assertion that 
Macy's offered Joanna the role 
of"Annie" on Broadway, and concluding that Macy's made no such 
representation, the District Court 
granted Macy's motion for summary judgment on these claims as well. See 
id.  
 
Plaintiffs then took this appeal. In their notice of appeal, plaintiffs 
state only that they appeal from the District 
Court's order granting summary judgment for Macy's. See App. at 235a. In 
this appeal, however, plaintiffs 
also argue that the District Court abused its discretion in limiting the 




A. We turn first to plaintiffs' argument that th e District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of 
Macy's on the breach of contract claim. We exercise plenary review over a 
grant of summary judgment and 
apply the same legal standard used by the District Court. See Hullet v. 
Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, 
Inc., 38 F.3d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1994). In so doing, we evaluate the 
evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's 
favor. See id. We conclude that the 
District Court erred.  
 
Under the law of Pennsylvania,5"[t]he promoter of a [prize-winning] 
contest, by making public the 
conditions and rules of the contest, makes an offer, and if before the 
offer is withdrawn another person acts 
upon it, the promoter is bound to perform his promise." Cobaugh v. Klick-
Lewis, Inc., 561 A.2d 1248, 
1249 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (quoting Annotation, Private Rights and 
Remedies Growing Out of 
Prize-winning Contests, 87 A.L.R.2d 649, 661). An 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
5. Because the laws of New York and Pennsylvania are identical in all 
aspects material to the resolution of 
this case, and because the parties do not assert a preference for the law 
of one jurisdiction over the other, 
we, like the District Court, will not engage in a choice of law analysis. 
See Pacitti v. Macy's, No. Civ. A. 
97-2557, 1998 WL 512938, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1998). In addressing 
plaintiffs' breach of 
contract claim, however, we refer only to the law of Pennsylvania. offer 
has been defined as "a manifestation 
of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another 
person in understanding that his assent to 
that bargain is invited and will conclude it." Cobaugh, 561 A.2d at 1249 
(citing Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 24; 8 P.L.E. Contracts § 23). The offer to award a prize 
results in an enforceable contract if the 
offeree performs the required action before the offer is withdrawn. See 
id.  
 
Here, the parties entered into an enforceable contract under Pennsylvania 
law. Macy's offered girls the 
opportunity of becoming "Broadway's New `Annie' " by participating in and 
winning the auditions, and 
Joanna participated in and won the auditions. Therefore, the dispute in 
this appeal relates to the parties' 
interpretation of that contract and, in particular, to the question 
whether the District Court properly found 
that the contract is unambiguous. Determining whether a contract is 
ambiguous is a legal question, and our 
review is plenary. See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc. , 
619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir. 
1980).  
 
The purpose of contract interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the 
objectively manifested intentions of 
the contracting parties. See Hullet v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, 
Inc., 38 F.3d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 
1994) (citing Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1009). The court first determines 
whether the contract is 
ambiguous. See Hullet , 38 F.3d at 111 (citing Stendardo v. Federal Nat'l 
Mortgage Ass'n, 991 F.2d 1089, 
1094 (3d Cir. 1993)). A contract is ambiguous if it is capable of more 
than one reasonable interpretation. 
See Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011 (defining ambiguity as an 
"[i]ntellectual uncertainty [or] the condition of 
admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, 
or referring to two or more 
things at the same time. . . ."). If the contract as a whole is 
susceptible to more than one reading, the 
factfinder resolves the matter. See Hullet, 38 F.3d at 111. On the other 
hand, where it is unambiguous and 
can be interpreted only one way, the court interprets the contract as a 
matter of law. See id.  
 
In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, the court "assumes the 
intent of the parties to an instrument 
is `embodied in the writing itself, and when the words are clear and 
unambiguous the intent is to be 
discovered only from the express language of the agreement.' " Id. (citing 
County of Dauphin v. Fidelity & 
Deposit Co., 770 F. Supp. 248, 251 (M.D. Pa.), aff 'd, 937 F.2d 596 (3d 
Cir. 1991)). This does not 
mean, however, that the court is confined to the "four corners of the 
written document." Hullet, 38 F.3d at 
111 (citing Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011). Rather, the court reads the 
contract in the context in which it 
was made. See Hullet, 38 F.3d at 111 (citing Steuart v. McChesney, 444 
A.2d 659, 662 (Pa. 1982)). 
Therefore, to determine the parties' intentions, the court may consider, 
among other things, "the words of the 
contract, the alternative meaning suggested by counsel, and the nature of 
the objective evidence to be 
offered in support of that meaning." Hullet, 38 F.3d at 111 (quoting 
Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011).  
 
In this case, the District Court concluded that the contract was 
unambiguous and capable of only one 
reasonable interpretation -- i.e., that Macy's offered only an audition 
for the opportunity to enter into a 
standard actors' equity contract with the producers for the title role in 
"Annie." See Pacitti v. Macy's, No. 
Civ. A. 97-2557, 1998 WL 512938, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1998). In 
reaching this conclusion, the 
Court noted that the official rules repeatedly referred to the promotion 
as an "audition," as opposed to a 
"contest," and vested "sole discretion" in the producers to make final 
determinations. See id. at *3. Hence, 
the District Court found that "Plaintiffs could not reasonably have relied 
upon Macy's as the selector of 
`Annie' or as a controller of the Producers," id., and that "it was 
obvious that Macy's was promoting 
auditions for the benefit of the Annie Producers." Id. at *4. The District 
Court also found that plaintiffs 
"knew that while Macy's was promoting the search, it was not the entity 
that would be contracting with the 
new `Annie.' " Id. at *3. Rather, the District Court noted, plaintiffs 
"wholly expected" to sign a standard 
actors' equity contract with the producers and, according to the Court, 
their expectation is evidenced by the 
fact that they executed such a contract after Joanna won the Search. See 
id. The Court explained further:  
 
The contract which she signed with the Producers did not guarantee her 
that she would open on Broadway, 
but instead considered her to be like every other actor in "Annie" who had 
won their role through an audition 
process but could be replaced at the Producers' discretion pursuant to the 
standard equity contract. 
943<!>Id. Therefore, the District Court rejected plaintiffs'  
 
contention that Macy's offered Joanna a guaranteed Broadway opening, see 
id. at *4, and the Court 
concluded:  
 
Plaintiffs received the benefit of their bargain by being offered a 
contract with the Producers for the "Annie" 
role, in exchange for Ms. Pacitti participating in "Macy's Search for 
Broadway's New Annie." . . . When the 
Producers offered a contract to Plaintiffs consistent with the terms of 
the Official Rules[,] any possible 




Applying the standards discussed above, we conclude that the District 
Court erred in determining that the 
contract was capable of only one reasonable interpretation. Plaintiffs' 
interpretation -- that Macy's offered 
the prize of performing as "Annie" on Broadway for at least some period -- 
is a reasonable alternative to that 
of the District Court.  
 
The official rules and promotional materials referred to the promotion as 
"Macy's Search for Broadway's 
New `Annie.' " The official rules provided that the producers and Macy's 
were "conducting a talent search 
for the new `Annie' to star in the 20th Anniversary Broadway production," 
and the advertisement in the 
Philadelphia Inquirer promised that "[t]he starring role in this 20th 
Anniversary Broadway Production and 
National Tour could be yours!" From these assertions, one reasonably could 
conclude that Macy's offered 
the winner of the Search the prize of starring as "Annie" on Broadway. In 
addition, the use of the word 
"audition," as opposed to "contest," in the official rules does not make 
plaintiffs' interpretation unreasonable. 
As plaintiffs assert:  
 
[T]he word `audition' refers to the process a contestant must undergo 
before she can `win' the prize. . . . It 
follows, one would think, the girl selected after the `final audition' has 
won something more than an 
`audition.' Appellants' Br. at 20-21 (emphasis in original).  
 
Moreover, it is not unreasonable to conclude that Macy's had the ability 
to offer the winner of the Search the 
starring role on Broadway. The official rules provided that:  
 
Annie, America's most beloved musical[,] and Macy's, the world's largest 
store, are conducting a talent 
search for a new "Annie" to star in the 20th Anniversary Broadway 
production and national Tour of Annie. . 
. .  
 
App. at 22a (emphasis added). That passage suggests that Macy's and the 
producers jointly promoted and 
hosted the Search. It does not indicate any relative imbalance of 
authority in favor of the producers. Nor do 
we believe that the clause vesting "sole discretion" in the producers 
supports only the interpretation that the 
producers were "the sole determiners of the Annie role." Pacitti, 1998 WL 
512938, at *3 (emphasis 
added). Rather, that clause can be interpreted more narrowly as only 
restricting Macy's from selecting the 
winner of the auditions.  
 
Further, Macy's at no point revealed -- either through its printed 
materials or other means -- that the winner 
of the Search would receive only the opportunity to sign a standard 
actors' equity contract with the 
producers. 6 Nor do the facts suggest that plaintiffs -- none of whom was 
a member of the Actors' Equity 
Association -- had any knowledge greater than that provided by Macy's. 7 
We do not believe that Macy's 
role was so "obvious" that it need not 
_________________________________________________________________  
 6. Macy's should have manifested its intention in the contract by limiting 
or qualifying its offer accordingly. 
See Cobaugh , 516 A.2d at 1250-51 (noting that it is the duty of the 
drafter of the contract to exercise due 
care in explaining its offer so as not to mislead the public); Hutchinson 
v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 
385, 390 n.5 (Pa. 1986) ("[I]n determining the intention of the parties to 
a written contract, the writing must 
be construed against the party drafting the document."). 7. We disagree 
with the District Court's assertion 
that based on the general release clause, it is clear that plaintiffs"knew 
that while Macy's was promoting the 
search, it was not the entity that would be contracting with the new 
`Annie.' " Pacitti, 1998 WL 512938, at 
*3. That clause provides:  
 
[Y]ou and your parent or legal guardian are responsible for your own 
conduct, and hereby release Macy's . 
. . and the Producers . . . from any liability to or with regard to the 
participants and/or her parent or legal 
guardian with respect to the audition(s).  
 
App. at 23a. As is clear from the language quoted above, that clause not 
only releases Macy's but also the 
producers. have limited its offer to the public, and we find it telling 
that Macy's contract with the producers 
contained qualifications on the prize to be offered. Therefore, we 
conclude that it was reasonable for 
plaintiffs to believe that Macy's offered the starring role of "Annie" on 
Broadway.  
 
We reach this conclusion even though plaintiffs executed a standard 
actors' equity contract with the 
producers. Courts may consider the subsequent actions of the contracting 
parties to ascertain the parties' 
intentions and resolve any ambiguities. See Department of Transp. v. 
Mosites Constr. Co., 494 A.2d 41, 43 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) ("The intention of the parties must control the 
interpretation of the contract but if 
the intent is unclear from the words of the contract, we may examine 
extrinsic evidence including 
consideration of the subject matter of the contract, the circumstances 
surrounding its execution and the 
subsequent acts of the parties."); see also In re Estate of Herr, 161 A.2d 
32, 34 (Pa. 1960). Joanna's 
contract with the producers, however, does not demonstrate plainly and 
unambiguously that when plaintiffs 
contracted with Macy's, they "wholly expected" to execute a standard 
actors' equity contract with the 
producers.  
 
For these reasons, we hold that the contractual language is ambiguous, and 
its interpretation should be left to 
the factfinder for resolution. Accordingly, the District Court erred in 
concluding that Macy's is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  
 
B. Macy's also contends that plaintiffs' claims ar e barred by the express 
release in the official rules. The 
official rules provide, in pertinent part:  
 
[Y]ou and your parent or legal guardian are responsible for your own 
conduct, and hereby release Macy's . 
. . and the Producers . . . from any liability to or with regard to the 
participants and/or her parent or legal 
guardian with respect to the audition(s).  
 
App. at 23a. That paragraph simply releases Macy's from liability "with 
respect to the audition(s)." It does 
not allow Macy's to escape liability arising from this action. We 
therefore reject Macy's contention. C. With 
respect to the tort causes of action, plai ntiffs maintain that the 
District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment. As noted above, the District Court dismissed these claims 
because it had rejected the predicate 
upon which each claim was based, i.e., that Macy's offered the successful 
participant the role of "Annie" on 
Broadway. See Pacitti, 1998 WL 512938, at *4. Because we conclude that the 
contract reasonably may 
be interpreted to make such an offer, we reverse on these claims as well 





We now turn to plaintiffs' contention that the District Court abused its 
discretion by limiting the scope of 
discovery.8 Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the District Court's 
discovery order precluded them from 
uncovering facts relevant to their fraudulent misrepresentation claims. 
Macy's asserts that review of this issue 
is improper and, in the alternative, that the District Court's order was a 
proper exercise of discretion. We 
conclude that review is appropriate and that the District Court abused its 
discretion.  
 
A. As a preliminary matter, we must determine whet her we have 
jurisdiction to review the discovery order. 
Macy's argues that we lack jurisdiction because plaintiffs' notice of 
appeal does not indicate that they are 
appealing the discovery order. In their notice of appeal, plaintiffs 
specify only the District Court's order of 




8. Citing Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 
568 (3d Cir. 1986), and 
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1073 (3d 
Cir. 1979), plaintiffs also 
argue that they were not given sufficient opportunity to conduct discovery 
to withstand Macy's motion for 
summary judgment and that therefore reversal of the summary judgment order 
is required. In response, 
Macy's contends that because plaintiffs failed to file a Rule 56(f) 
motion, they have not preserved this issue 
for appeal. Because we are reversing on the breach of contract claim, we 
need not address this issue.  
 
9. The notice of appeal provides, in full: conclude that plaintiffs' 
notice of appeal from the District Court's 
final judgment is sufficient to support the Court's earlier discovery 
order.  
 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) states that the notice of appeal 
must "designate the judgment, 
order or part thereof appealed from." Fed. R. App. P. 3(c). However, we 
liberally construe the 
requirements of Rule 3(c). See Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 
853, 858 (3d Cir. 1990); 
Williams v. Guzzardi, 875 F.2d 46, 49-50 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, we have 
stated:  
 
[W]hen an appellant gives notice that he is appealing from a final order, 
failing to refer specifically to earlier 
orders disposing of other claims or other parties does not preclude us 
from reviewing those orders.  
 
Shea v. Smith, 966 F.2d 127, 129 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Murray v. 
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 782 F.2d 
432, 434 (3d Cir. 1986)). And we have explained: "[S]ince . . . only a 
final judgment or order is appealable, 
the appeal from afinal judgment draws in question all prior non-final 
orders and rulings." See Drinkwater, 
904 F.2d at 858 (exercising jurisdiction over unspecified order because 
finality doctrine barred plaintiff from 
appealing that order until after the entry of final judgment) (citing 
Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 
F.2d 1252, 1253 (3d Cir. 1977) (per curiam)); see also Polonski v. Trump 
Taj Mahal Assocs., 137 F.3d 
139, 144 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 66 (1998) ("[Liberal] 
treatment is particularly appropriate 
where the order appealed is discretionary and relates back to the judgment 
sought to be reviewed."); 
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
Notice is hereby given that Joanna Pacitti, a minor, by Joseph Pacitti and 
Stella Pacitti, her parents and 
guardians, plaintiffs in the above-named case, hereby appeal to the United 
States Court of Appeal[s] for the 
Third Circuit from an order granting summary judgment in favor of 
defendant Macy's and Macy's East and 
against plaintiffs which dismissed the action as to defendant Macy's and 
Macy's East. The said Order hereby 
appealed from was entered in this action on the 19th day of August, 1998.  
 
App. at 235a. 147, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[W]e construe notices of 
appeal liberally as covering 
unspecified prior orders if they are related to the specified order that 
was appealed from."); Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, Jurisdiction 3d § 3949.4 ("[A] 
notice of appeal that names the final 
judgment is sufficient to support review of all earlier orders that merge 
in the final judgment under the general 
rule that appeal from a final judgment supports review of all earlier 
interlocutory orders.").  
 
We have reviewed orders not specified in the notice of appeal where: (1) 
there is a connection between the 
specified and unspecified order, (2) the intention to appeal the 
unspecified order is apparent, and (3) the 
opposing party is not prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the 
issues. See Polonski, 137 F.3d at 
144 (exercising jurisdiction over order granting attorney's fees even 
though notice of appeal specified only 
the order granting summary judgment); Tabron, 6 F.3d at 153 n.2 (reviewing 
order denying request for 
counsel even though notice of appeal specified only the order granting 
summary judgment).  
 
Review is appropriate here. The discovery order is sufficiently related to 
the order granting summary 
judgment. The final judgment rule barred plaintiffs from appealing the 
discovery order until the District Court 
granted Macy's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' notice of appeal 
from the final judgment, therefore, 
brought up for review the earlier interlocutory discovery order. Cf. 
Drinkwater, 904 F.2d at 858; Polonski, 
137 F.3d at 144; Tabron, 6 F.3d at 153 n.2; Wright, Miller & Cooper, 
Federal Practice & Procedure, 
Jurisdiction 3d § 3949.4. Moreover, Macy's had notice of plaintiffs' 
intent to appeal the discovery order 
since plaintiffs sought review of the entire judgment and argued the 
merits of the discovery order in their 
opening appellate brief. See Polonski, 137 F.3d at 144 (stating that "the 
appellate proceedings clearly 
manifest an intent to appeal"); see also Canady v. Crestar Mortgage Corp., 
109 F.3d 969, 974 (4th Cir. 
1997) (noting that arguing merits of issue in opening appellate brief puts 
appellee on notice as to that issue). 
And finally, we discern no prejudice to Macy's. Accordingly, we have 
jurisdiction. B. Having found that we 
have jurisdiction to revie w this issue, we must next determine whether 
the District Court abused its 
discretion in limiting discovery to "what promises, if any, were made by 
defendant prior to and at the final 
audition . . . in New York City that the person selected at that audition 
would appear in the role as Annie." 
App. at 38a. Plaintiffs contend that the District Court abused its 
discretion by unduly limiting discovery to 
preclude them from obtaining information relevant to their fraudulent 
misrepresentation claims. We review 
the District Court's discovery order for abuse of discretion. See Arnold 
Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General 
Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 568 (3d Cir. 1986).  
 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide, in pertinent part:  
 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense 
of the party seeking discovery or to 
the claim or defense of any other party. . . . The information sought need 
not be admissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence.  
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). It is well recognized that the federal rules 
allow broad and liberal discovery. See 
In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Pretrial discovery is . . 
. `accorded a broad and liberal 
treatment.' ") (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)); see 
also Wright, Miller & Marcus, 
Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil 2d § 2007 ("The rule does allow broad 
scope to discovery and this has 
been well recognized by the courts.").  
 
To succeed on a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation under Pennsylvania 
law, plaintiffs must establish the 
following elements: (1) a misrepresentation, (2) a fraudulent utterance, 
(3) an intention to induce action on 
the part of the recipient, (4) a justifiable reliance by the recipient 
upon the misrepresentation, and (5) damage 
to the recipient as a proximate result. See Banks v. Jerome Taylor & 
Assocs., 700 A.2d 1329, 1333 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1997). To prove these elements, plaintiffs must demonstrate 
that Macy's fraudulently 
misrepresented that the successful participant would perform as "Annie" on 
Broadway, that it did so with the 
intent to induce participation in the Search, and that Joanna relied to 
her detriment upon the 
misrepresentation.  
 
Plaintiffs seek production of the following: (1) Macy's communications 
with, and relationship to, the 
producers regarding the terms of the contract that the producers intended 
to offer the successful contestant 
and (2) the pecuniary benefit Macy's received as a result of the Search. 
See Appellants' Br. at 12, 24. This 
information could shed light on Macy's knowledge that it could not offer a 
Broadway opening and its 
motives for failing to limit the offer accordingly. Thus, we conclude that 
the discovery sought here is directly 
relevant to the subject matter of this dispute.  
 
We also find it noteworthy that Macy's submitted its contract with the 
producers in support of summary 
judgment. As previously noted, the federal rules permit discovery of, 
among other things, "any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the 
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense 
of any other party . . . ." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).  
 
Macy's asserts that the only relevant representations are "those to which 
plaintiffs were . . . privy" and "upon 
which plaintiffs could have reasonably relied." Appellee's Br. at 34. This 
"what they don't know can't hurt 
them" argument is unconvincing. The fact that plaintiffs were not privy to 
the information that Macy's 
possessed when Joanna relied on its representations and participated in 
the Search forms the very basis of 
plaintiffs' fraudulent misrepresentation claims.10 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
10. Plaintiffs also argue that the District Court erred in limiting the 
number of depositions. In light of our 
disposition here, the District Court on remand can reconsider whether 
additional depositions are necessary 
to effectuate plaintiffs' discovery needs with respect to their fraudulent 
misrepresentation claims. Only if one 
of the factors in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2) is present 
should the Court limit the number of 
depositions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) (setting forth situations in 
which courts may limit the number of 
depositions). Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court erred in 




For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the grant of summary judgment 
on all claims and remand for 
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We also reverse and 
remand for plaintiffs to conduct 
discovery consistent with this opinion.  
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